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10. Self-Help and Development
Planning in the Yemen Arab Republic
Sheila Carapico

Virtually all contemporary development strategies
stress the importance of participation by working
people in both policy formation and the benefits of
economic growth.
Development requires .capital formation for investment in the social and economic
infrastructures.
Unless development investments involve mass organization, representing broad social
strata, they tend to benefit only a minority of landed,
administrative, or merchant capital elites. The result
is an uneven pattern of development throughout the
country and very often, declining standards of living
for the poor majority. Moreover, numerous studies show
that "top-down" programs for involving peasants in
local organizations and investment projects have rarel~
provided a solution to the crisis of underdevelopment.
Centrally dominated mobilization strategies may
fail because of excessive bureaucratization, the attitudes of administrators sent to the local areas, or the
inherited mistrust with which peasants view centra~
institutions and other forms of external encroachment.
Research has also shown tremendous variability in the
capacity of local organizations, usually imported from
outside, to improve real standards of living in the
Third World. Some of the most pessimistic reports come
from Latin American and African case studies, whereas
there is more evidence of local organizations contributing to the increase and equitable distribution of
resources in Asia. Nevertheless, there is considerable
variability within Asia and the Middle East.
There is also widespread agreement that local
organizations in Afro-Asian and Latin countries cannot
be evaluated through the prism of the civic-rational
morality of the West. Many observers have argued that
it is unreaso~ble to apply Weberian or Taylorist management models to Third World institutions because the
models contain certain ci vie and sociological presuppositions which are not merely absent from the culture
but incompatible with the existing system and relations
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of production. Case studies have contributed to criticism of the old modernization approach which assumed a
priori commitment to civic values of democratic paF
ticipation, rational-rules maintenance, and conflict
resolution through the hierarchical institutions of the
state.
A study of Middle and Far Eastern cases suggests
that the importance or weakness of an institution is
determined not by its legal organization or even its
internal management, but by its relations to other
institutions in the national system. Two kinds of relations are implied, first, linkages to other facets of
the social and political structure and, second, one institution's viability relative to alternative channels.
Uphoff and Esman's comparison of eighteen Asian local
development organization systems offers the conclusion
that horizontal and vertical linkages between and among
institutions ~re the key to the strength of local
organizations.
In addition,
local organizations
should be evaluated in terms of their relevance to certain critical development functions:
planning and
goal-setting, administration and interest articulation,
resource mobilization, and especially, the provision
and integration of services.
Relevance indicates the
importance of one organizational system in performing
these functions compared with the contribution of alternative institutions (e.g •• the private sector or the
government).
Uphoff and Esman have identified a number of
structural characteristics associated with the more
viable developmental organizations capable of promoting
relatively equitable access to services. First, there
should be more than one level of organization, preferably the lower tier functioning at the 11eighborhood or
hamlet level.
Second, multiple channels should link
the community to higher levels of authority; there
should be alternative channels within the system of
local organizations.
However, too many channels or
levels may unduly complicate or clog the system.
In
addition, organizations with multiple functions seem to
be more effective than single-purpose associations.
Although again, no association can be all things to all
people.
Third, politics and political competition or
even conflict "must be accepted as inevitable and
legitimate." If resources are being mobilized and the
social infrastructure altered, there is bound to be
politics.
Fourth, there should be sanction both from
above and from below, in the form of elections, audits,
public meetings, and so forth, to ensure accountability
to both constituents and government. Accountability to
citizens is important to assure trust in the system and
equity of participation in decisions and benefits.
Accountability to the state is important because in
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virtually all cases the state controls essential resources for development.
Finally, decentralization of
operating decisions, though not the extreme of autonomy, which implies weak linkages, enhances effectiveness in the provision of services. The deconcentration
or devolution of functions and decision-m5king is maximized by distribution of economic assets.
Local development activities in the Yemen Arab
Republic have made a major contribution to the extension of rudimentary services to towns, villages and
hamlets during the past decade.
Under particular circumstances, local and regional groups have mobilized
capital for investment in dirt roads, simple water
collection and distribution systems, primary s.chools,
electrical generators and other basic services.
Most
observers familiar with other examples have hailed the
Yemeni development cooperatives as an unusually successful model for local participation in development.
One study of forty-one local associatLons in seven
least-developed countries show& the four Yemeni examples among the most viable.
A number of Western
researchers have concurred in the Yemeni Cooperative
Movement's claim to uniqueness, calling it "grassroots," "participatory," and a "bottom-up" development
strategy which demonstrates "the potential for indigenous organizations to achieve dramatic development
results and trcome important, nationally recognized
institutions."
Several Western and multilateral technical assistance agencies have commissioned studies of
the Yemeni development cooperatives and targeted programs to work through district development boards.
Most close observers in the late 1970s also agreed
that from the perspective of public administration, the
local development cooperatives system is very weak.
Local board members, officers of their central confederation, and foreigners hired to implement donor
strategies in conjunction with the development cooperatives, recognized difficulties in staffing, recordkeeping, project maintenance, planning and budgeting,
and interagency communication.
These difficulties,
inherent in the process of institution-building, were
exacerbated by federalism, local feuds, peasant apathy,
and corruption.
The government and the cooperative
confederation, as well as foreign technical assistance
projects, have repeatedly stressed the need for in~ti
tution building to improve planning and management.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the apparent paradox of a managerial system which repiains
administratively weak and yet has been notably successful in providing very basic services.
The Yemeni
associations, while adhering to few of the conventions
of public office management, have played a salient role
in the provision of services and other development
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functions. The apparent paradox is partially resolved
through the application of the relevance and linkages
criteria outlined above, according to which the Yemeni
associations appear among the more organized.
But
there is also tension within the system between a real
imperative for rational planning and resources allocation on the one hand and voluntary local participation on the other.
While participation in fundraising for local services has been fairly high,
farmers' and townspeople's appreciation for planning,
budgetary, and even elections procedures is limited.
Efforts to routinize the activities of development
associations often appear as central meddling in local
affairs. Committed to local services, people have not
necessarily viewed participation in formal central
civic institutions as a means to this end.
There may
exist a certain structural contradiction between political, financial, and benefit participation at the
grassroots level, and the imperatives of routinized
rational planning on a national scale.
If Yemeni self-help has achieved beyond its manifest managerial capacity, it has done so under unique
circumstances. The special conditions in Yemen in the
past two decades are not to be replicated in other
nations, nor perhaps even in the Yemeni future.
The
first feature which sets north Yemen off from the
majority of Third World nations is the absence of a
Western colonial legacy.
The Turks made two long but
ultimately fruitless attempts to pacify Yemen and the
British empire declared a protectorate over the southern slice of the Arabian Peninsula (now the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, with its capital at
Aden), but north Yemen was never truly colonized.
No
Western legal or administrative forms were imported, no
cooperative or civic associations introduced.
No
foreign capital entered the country.
No railroads or
other modern infrastructure were built. In the midtwentieth century Yemen was highly traditional, a precapital~t
as
opposed
to
peripheral
capitalist
enclave.
The second factor which distinguishes the circumstances of local and regional development activity is
the weakness of the central state.
Between 1911 and
1962 the country was ruled by autocratic Imams.
The
state collected taxes,
principally the zakat and
various surcharges, but returned few public services.
There was perennial resistance to the state from
tribesmen and peasants in various parts of the country
throughout the period, and a deep mistrust of central
authority among the majority.
In 1962 a military coup
deposed the Imams. There followed four years of civil
war in which Egypt supported the republic against the
Saudi-backed royalists.
The republic was victorious,
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but there was a bloodless coup d'etat in 1968, followed
bY a military corrective movement in 1974 and presidential assassinations in 1977 and 1978.
In the meantime there have been numerous border incidents (both
north and south) and local insurrections.
Since 1962
and especially since 1974, the government has endeavored to staff service ministries with educated
Yemenis, create national highway, health, educational,
and electrification systems, secure its boundaries and
legitimize its rule in the interior. During the present
administration of Lt .-Col. 'Ali 1 Abdullah Saleh, who
has outlasted most of his predecessors, true progress
has been realized on all these fronts.
The state is
now perhaps stronger than it has ever been.
Nonetheless, the government has only recently asr8med responsibility for the welfare of its citizens.
The availability and dispersion of cash due to
high rates of labor migration to the oil-rich economies
of the Arab Gulf was the most striking feature of the
Yemeni economy in the 1970s.
During the peak of the
oil boom, as much as a third of the male labor force
absented itself from the farms and petty trades. Their
remitted earnings reached an estimated U.S. $1.5 billion in 1979-1980.
Because migration was so widespread, most of the country's approximately seven million inhabitants benefited either directly or indirectly from this infusion of cash.
According to all
reports, the lion's share of this remitted income was
spent on various forms of social prestige and direct
consumption --- bridewealth, residential construction,
home appliances, and furnishings, televisions and video
machines, yard goods and jewelry, imported foods and
tobacco products, and on the means to these luxuries,
vehicles, roads, electrical generators, and water deli very sys terns.
The government's capacity to tax remitted income was limited to customs on legal imports.
Moreover, most of this "unrequited transfer" never
entered the banking system.
Nor were private sector
institutions capable of accumulating a significant
share of aggregate remittances for investment in social
or productive infrastructure.
The widespread availability of hard cash contrasted ~~arply with a very low
level of capitalist development.
The very primitive level of services initially is
also an important point.
Until after the civil war
most Yemeni women transported jugs of water for household use on their heads. Other methods were by donkey,
camel, or on foot.
Most people had never seen an
electric light bulb or a motor vehicle.
Some boys
studied at mosque schools; the daughters of the elite
had private tutors; ninety percent of the population
was unlettered. Limited labor migration to Aden in the
1930s, 1940s and 1950s had helped spread news of the
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physical comforts available on the outside and dissent
against the Imams.
During and after the revolutionary
war, awareness of and desire for commodities and
services increased. In the mid to late 1970s access to
hard currency and the economic open door made possible
the importation of bulldozers, drilling rigs, genera tors, pumps, pipes, and building materials.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS
There have been three stages in the evolution of
what the Yemenis call their cooperative movement.
The
first consisted of extra-legal, informal, and largely
uncoordinated project activity. Efforts to build small
schools, water systems, and other simple services prior
to the revolution were confined mainly to the area
which had experienced the greatest commercial influence
from the outside.
After the end of the civil war,
phase two saw the foundation of formal cooperative,
welfare, and development associations by regional
elites in many parts of the country.
The government
encouraged these activities in limited ways. In 1973 a
confederation of development cooperatives was founded;
the following year its president took over the government in a military corrective movement.
Subsequently
the development associations were given a formal legal
identity, empowered to receive and spend tax revenues,
and accorded a role in national development planning.
Development associations were organized in nearly every
district nationwide, and each district was represented
at the provincial and national levels via the cooperative confederation. During this third stage the local
development associations made a major contribution to
the extension of road, educational, and water and electrical services to the smaller towns and rural areas.
In addition, agricultural cooperatives and a cooperative credit bank were founded to encourage capital
formation for investment in income-generating activities. It seems that 1982 marked the beginning of a
new phase in which the latter will increasingly be
emphasized, following the completion of primary infrastructure.
The seed of self-help lay deep in the traditional
society, but its germination came from the winds of
change.
Much of contemporary development practice
finds precedent in Islamic tradition or local custom.
Historically,
limited public services and welfare
functions were provided through religious institutions.
Mosques provided public bathing facilities.
Education
and some gravity-flow water delivery systems were supported by the waqf, or religious trust. The zakat represented a pious obligation to give alms; wealthy
families were expected to give sometimes to the poor.
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Both Islam and local traditions within Yemen tend to
stress collective and community values.
While traditional production techniques were primarily suited to a
division of farm tasks within the extended family
household, there were mechanisms for levying collective
labor for emergency relief or other special activities.
The principle of collective responsibility applied in
the raising of blood money within a kin group and sometimes in tax collections within a village or tribe.
Most efforts to mobilize contributions to a project
have recalled these moral and primordial values.
Some
activities have been organized by religious dignitaries
or by tribal shaykhs.
However, it is possible to overstate the role of
traditional values and affiliations in development cooperation. Traditional society consists of animosity as
well as affection; the extent of community cooperation
should not be unduly romanticized. Preexisting institutions afforded only the barest minimum. of services.
Moreover, the history of the cooperative movement shows
its close association with two factors which ultimately
contributed to the transformation of the1 ~mamic system
-- migration and the liberal movement.
Both were
forms of resistance to or escape from political and
economic backwardness, and to increased appropriation
of a dwindling agricultural surplus in the form of
taxes and crop-shares. Under the Imams, many thousands
of young men left the fields for Aden and points
abroad.
Many of them hailed from the part of north
Yemen known as the southern uplands, which was closest
to the bustling British port.
Migrants' associations
at first provided insurance and communications services, then raised funds to educate members' sons and
nephews in Aden.
Following this model, village associations in the southern uplands raised donations
from migrants and residents for village schools and
water tanks.
Through migration and clandestine communications, awareness of and demand f'or rudimentary
public services spread. This became one of' the demands
of the emerging anti-Imamic movement in the 1930s and
1940s.
Another issue associated with both the cooperative
and the liberal movement was the release of zakat for
expenditure in the region of its collection.
In many
regions local elites, both progressive and traditional,
called for recognized bodies of regional self-governance. The republican movement also advocated rights of
voluntary association and assembly, freedom of trade,
liberalization of the press, secularization of· education, and the creation of cooperatives to encourage
agricultural modernization.
The early self-help efforts) mostly ad hoc and
short-lived, often combined traditional with reformist

210

concerns.
Since one-room schools, cisterns or water
channels, public baths, and wayfarer shelters had
generally been maintained as charitable foundations,
incremental improvements to these facilities naturally
recalled religious and familial values.
Projects were
typically simple and did not require a special ongoing
organization for their execution. The first organized
development board which kept records of its plans and
activities was the Hodeldah city town improvement
board, established just months before the September 26,
1962 revolution. Yemen's major Red Sea port was experiencing some urban growth, commercialization, and
light industrialization. The town board was formed in
direct response to a fire which had destroyed a large
section of thatched huts.
The board kept records,
collected some taxes on trade, hired some workers, purchased vehicles, and drew up a plan for fire fighting
brigades and drainage of unhealthful standing water
after rains.
Formalized in a way village welfare and
projects committees were not, the Hodeidah association
represented a prelude to stage two.
The other major
towns 1 301lowed the port's
example several years
later.
The first republican regime of Abdullah al-Sallal
opened the door to poll ti cal and economic liberalization and endorsed the principle of local development.
Two laws in 1963 legalized the formation of voluntary
associations for cl vie, charitable, or cultural purposes.
Although vaguely worded and permissive rather
than proscriptive, the laws are often cited as a landmark for local development activity.
But during the
next four years the government was preoccupied with the
war and other pressing matters of state.
Very little
attention or resources were diverted to public services, especially beyond the major urban areas. There
was talk of social and economic development through cooperation, but little concerted action and no vertical
or horizontal coordination of efforts. The first phase
of localized informal self-help activities persisted
through the civil war.
During the war the perceived need for public
services deepened.
Unfortunately, the war coincided
with several years of drought, which deprived many
communities of their normal water sources and reduced
agricultural output.
In some areas the fighting destroyed existing cisterns or footpaths.
Tanks and
trucks rolled into the countryside.
The Egyptian
soldiers sent to fight on behalf of the republic
scorned the primitive Yemeni way of life and quite possibly exaggerated the modern services available in
Egypt. The Y.A.R. government, with international technical support, constructed a paved highway from the
seaport of Hodeidah to the highland capital at Sana'a,
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and began work on roads connecting these two cities to
the t9_lqrd urban center, the southern uplands city of
Ta'iz.
Vehicles, water pumps, electrical generators,
radios, televisions, books, and bulldozers were imported in increasing numbers, along with countless commodities and gadgets.
While the war and the drought
exacerbated the need for services, roads and imported
innovations presented new possibilities for small-scale
improvements.
Local projects incorporated some new
technology, but the magnitude of these projects was
modest.
Most organizational and project activities
were undocumented.
The declaration of peace in 1968 represented a
turning point in many respects.
One of the last acts
of the al-Sallal regime was the release of a quarter of
the zakat for local development.
In November, the
Quadi al-Iryani quietly replaced al-Sallal.
Among
other things, the new government created a Department
of Youth, Labor, and Social Affairs to encourage civic
and cooperative institutions and local self-help initiatives. Efforts to staff and strengthen the ministries
of public works, education, and health reflected a new
commitment to public services.
Within the next few
years, a large number of international donors (both
capitalist and socialist) pledged support. Still, the
task of providing basic infrastructure and services to
a predominantly rural population in rugged terrain was
tremendous, and the capacity of the state still inchoate.
The second stage in local development activity was
different from the first in that specifically organizational behavior became more salient.
A number of
regional,
provincial,
and urban associations were
founded.
These adopted formal names, development association, local cooperative, welfare society.
They
engaged in constituent activities like drawing up bylaws and budgets, holding public administrative board
elections, and writing regional development plans.
They organized such larger and more complex projects as
regional roads and small town water systems, often combining voluntary contributions with taxes and levies,
and ministerial and even international assistance.
There were several reasons for the trend toward
larger organizations. First, there were limits on what
could be accomplished relying on local resources alone.
In many endeavors there were clear economies of scale.
This was especially true in the case of roads in the
hinterland; what a single clan or village could not do,
many cooperating communities within a region could.
There was also, of course, a political motivation for
establishment of a new civic institution.
For many it
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represented a regionally based authority parallel to
the lower echelons of the Ministry of Local Administration, a potential instrument of local self-governance and symbol of relative autonomy from the central
state. For the politically ambitious, the cooperative
or welfare association represented a new arena defined
by the poll ti cal currency of service projects.
While
seeking a degree of administrative and budgetary independence from the center, many associations took pains
to register with the department of social affairs in
hopes of gaining ministerial assistance for regional
and local projects.
Leaders in some areas were also
conscious of the potential for foreign aid, which they
hoped would be more generous and technically competent
than Sana'a's.
Organizational activity was something of an elite
phenomena in that most participants were literate. Two
groups were mainly involved.
The progressive or perceptive wing of the old landed and shaykhly clans acted
to stay the slippage in their authority under the ancient regime; and younger republican counter-elites and
military officers saw themselves as a new generation of
regional and national leadership. In founding development cooperatives, these men hoped to marshal popular
interest in improved services in order to gain concessions from government, incidentally enhancing their own
prestige both locally and nationally.
Though neither
radical nor altruistic, their appeals to public welfare
and the cooperative spirit nonetheless seemed progressively populistic in contrast with the old order.
In the spring of 1973 two meetings were held to
establish a confederation of self-help organizations.
The meetings were attended by representatives of the
government and of over two dozen self-help societies;
there were a few other committedly federalist groups
which declined at the time to participate in a national
union.
After some debate, all member associations
agreed to a common name, which translated 11 terally
means "local development cooperative society." This is
usually rendered "LDA" for local development association in English; in Arabic it is generally called
al-ta'awun, which implies cooperative self-help.
The
purpose of the cooperative confederation, called CYDA
in English for Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations, was to encourage local development efforts,
especially by seeking government and foreign assistance
for local projects.
Delegates to the second meeting
elected an articulate young m111 tary officer, Ibrahim
al-Hamdi, as president of the confederation.
He
praised previous self-help efforts, noted the weakness
of the government in providing services, and called for
greater cooperation both at the local level and between
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development associations and government.
To demonstrate its backing for development activities, the government promised half of zakat for local projects.
A year later, al-Hamd1 assumed leadership of the
republic in a military coup designated the corrective
movement, drawing the cooperat1 ve confederation into
the national limelight. Al-Hamd1 promised greater government encourageme~~ for self-help in the provinces.
In 1975, Law No. 35
authorized the establishment of
development cooperatives whose purpose would be to
foster communities' efforts to improve communications,
health, education, agriculture, and general services.
Development cooperatives in the towns and districts
were authorized to receive municipal and custpms revenues in addition to half of the zakat.
In 1976,
nationwide cooperative elections were culminated with
much fanfare and the promulgation of a cooperative plan
partially attuned to the first national five-year plan
(1976-81).
Between the 1974 corrective movement and the end
of the first five-year plan in 1981, the cooperative
development movement expanded, diversified, and 1nst1tut1onal1zed.
The expansion in project activities reflected the increased ava1lab111ty of cash due to heavy
migration and remittances.
Initially it seemed that
growth in organizational and project activities rested
on the leadership of President al-Hamd1. But the movement survived his assassination and the politically
uncertain tenure of his successor, Ahmad al-Ghashm1,
who showed his support for the LDAs by raising their
share of the zakat to three-quarters.
Since 1978,
'All' Abdullah Saleh' s government has concentrated on
the financial and economic aspects of local development
through agricultural cooperatives and the cooperative
credit bank.
During this third stage there was an exponential
expansion of the numbers of development and cooperative
ass oc1at1ons and the range of their act1 vi ties.
The
number of local development associations increased from
twenty-eight in the first year to nearly 200 in 1981.
The rapid increase in the numbers of associations ls
explained by two factors.
First, many of the regional
and provincial associations founded between 1968 and
1974 divided into two or several district associations
after 1975.
This fission was partly a response to
administrative decentralization under the corrective
movement, whlf~ reduced the size of basic administrative units.
Second, interest in roads and other
projects had spread to some previously inactive regions, particularly in the north and east. The promise
of regular revenues and of central assistance for
district projects induced the formation of many new
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boards. By 1981 there were LDAs in every district, and
larger towns had their own development association.
In addition to the increase in numbers of LDAs,
there was diversification of the kinds of associations
confederated through CYDA.
In particular, several
agricultural cooperatives were founded.
The idea of
agricultural societies had been proposed even before
the revolution by intellectuals.
Unlike the multifunctional, services oriented development associations,
whose membership was 1nclus1 ve within a geographical
area, the agricultural cooperatives were economically
oriented, specialized associations with specific objectives. Membership was voluntary in the form of purchase of shares in the cooperative.
Al though a few
radicals had suggested collectivization (especially of
state lands), the general consensus was that north
Yemeni cooperatives should encourage rather than supplant private entrepreneurship in farming.
Thus the
function of the agricultural coops were to make capital
inputs more readily available to members and other
farmers in a region, and to encourage the transl ti on
from subsistence to market-oriented production. Activities of the cooperative should both enhance the prof1tab111 ty of production and increase the share capital
of the society through investment.
For instance,
farmers' cooperatives operated service and petrol stations or water drilling rigs, hoping thereby to both
stimulate farm modernization and earn revenues for the
society.
CYDA moved its offices from an old Sana'ani house
to a modern office complex on the airport road, symbolizing its institutionalization.
Gradually specialized committees and departments within the confederation
(financial,
foreign,
technical and cultural
affairs, afforestation, etc.) were staffed with administrative, clerical, and technical personnel.
The
cooperative press expanded from a mimeographed circular
to include a newspaper, several periodicals geared
towards popular audiences, a scholarly journal dealing
with development issues, and the broadcast media which
now reached every Yemeni home.
At the provincial
level, the coordinating councils, the presidents of all
LDAs in the province plus the governor, a presidential
appointee, established offices and acquired staff and
equipment.
Both CYDA and its provincial branches
became visible institutions.
In 1981 a separate law
defined the legal sta\Uf of the confederation and the
coordinating councils.
Their prescribed function is
mainly to mobilize, advise, and audit the activities of
member associations.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONS
Both the structure and the operating procedures of
the development cooperatives system have evolved during
a period of more than a decade, and are still being
refined.
The preceding historical synopsis has shown
that the impetus for these activities originated neither with the grassroots nor the center, but combined
bottom-up with top-down and middle-both ways initiatives. Often simultaneous, but uncoordinated, activities at several levels, local, district, regional,
provincial, and national, evolved into a multitiered
system. Rules and procedures have never been cogently
laid out in one document, but have emerged incrementally via both legislation and praxis.
The principle of planning and implementation, as
laid out in various laws, speeches, and articles,
leaves considerable initiative to the localities.
Project proposals originate at the village or hamlet
level and are passed upward through the district's development board and the provincial coordinating council
(CC) to CYDA and then to the relevant ministries for
inclusion in the national plan.
Once this planning
exercise has been completed, the onus for initiating a
particular project falls again to the beneficiaries.
The actual community to be served not the development
board, which represents dozens or hundreds of neighborhoods and hamlets, is expected to initiate and oversee
projects.
Here is how the system is supposed to work. Each
community, approximately 500 persons, elects one representative to a general assembly of the local development association.
These representatives discuss the
services needs of the community with their neighbors.
Then the general assembly meets to elect from among
their number seven or nine members of the administrative board of the development association (LDB).
The board elects its own president, secretary-general,
treasurer, and other officers and then meets with the
general assembly to discuss their project proposals and
plans.
The boards should compile a district or town
development plan on the basis of project proposals and
estimates of its own resources, suggesting integration
of individual community projects where cost-efficient.
Next, the presidents of the development boards meet
with the governor as the coordinating council of the
province to aggregate and rationalize plans at the provincial level. Finally, three officers of each development association attend a grand national conference.
The cooperative conference elects from among its membership the administrative board and officers of CYDA,
and draws together the plans of the various development
associations into a national cooperative plan.
The
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CYDA board and their staff disaggregate plans by sector
and forward them to the relevant ministries, public
works, education, health, and sometimes agriculture,
for incorporation into the national five year plan,
along with ministerial priorities such as national
roads, university and teacher training institutes, hospitals, sea and airports, and so forth.
One of the multiple connotations of cooperation is
that specific projects receive funding from a diversity
of sources.
Most projects should draw on at least
three kinds of resources:
beneficiaries, the development board's budget, and central matching funds.
The
process of collecting beneficiary shares has not been
specified by central guidelines, but left to local convention. The LDA's budget derives from three-quarters
of the district's zakat, one quarter of the municipalities tax in the area, a share of the 2.5 percent cooperative customs tax, and other local taxes and contributions as they are able to collect.
Central
matching funds for a locally initiated project were to
be made available only upon completion of the initial
stage or stages of construction. So that development
boards could estimate their project expenditures on
primary services, a formula for the proportional division of financial responsibility among local, LDA, and
central resources was issued.
Project costs should be
divided as follows:
SECTOR

CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT

Education
Water Projects•
Health Sector
Roads
1-20 Kms
20-30 Kms
over 30 Kms

33.3%
25
25
25

50

%
%
%
%

LOA
BUDGET

33.3%
25 %
25 %

PEOPLE OF
LOCALITY

33.3%
50 %
50 %

100 %
(cost sharing determined
by LOA and Locality)

• If total costs of a water project exceed YR 200,000,
the government may provide up to eighty percent.
The specification of four project areas was not
intended to limit activity, but these were the only
sectors in which the government promised material support.
Subsequently, electricity projects were rncognized as legitimate local development activities,
but
the government promised only to eventually incorporate
local systems into the national power grid.
Development boards were also theoretically motivated to improve agricultural production as a means of augmenting
their zakat-based revenues.
The board was also supposed to own ten percent of the share capital of local
agricultural cooperatives, if any.
Other projects,
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which included tree planting, youth clubs, mosque construction and repairs, and other miscellaneous activities, could be financed from local and/or development
association funds, and might receive some central assistance.
The system was rather ingenious, in that it seemed
to make the most of limited resources and local participation.
There was room for variations in associations' aspirations, financial resources, and interest
and commitment.
But the difficulties in routinizing
the prescribed process were manifold. Turnout for both
the 1975 and 1979 elections was uneven:
in some districts men assembled in large numbers, whereas elsewhere few people voted.
Likewise, plans submi.tted by
village and neighborhood representatives ranged from
detailed budgets for dozens of projects to a few items
hastily scribbled on a bit of brown paper.
There was
too little time between election and submission of
plans for careful review.
There was no ~ormal way of
incorporating the proposals of boards formed after
promulgation of the national plan in 1976 into the
national plan.
Because of this last difficulty, the
five-year cooperative plan was scrapped and a new
three-year plan (1978/79 - 1980/81) was written.
Adherence to the guidelines and regulations of
CYDA and even to boards' own plans varied considerably.
Nowhere did organizations operate purely by the book.
Records, required by CYDA prerequisite to the release
of centrally controlled funds, were haphazardly kept.
Elections results were challenged after the fact, or
members resigned. Fights and work stoppages were frequent as one locality or tribe challenged another's
appropriation of water resources, regional transport
routes, or development associations funds. The government turned out to be notoriously slow in providing
funds, so much so that beneficiaries or boards, having
already committed resources, were forced to make up the
central share.
Cost estimates often proved to have
been hopelessly unrealistic.
Boards found themselves
unable to keep all of their verbal commitments.
Few
members serving between 1976 and 1979 understood all
the procedures or appreciated the relevance of bookkeeping guidelines. From the perspective of the charactered rational management model, the system was a
shambles.
Nonetheless, in the third stage the local development organizations displayed considerable strength according to the criteria used by Uphoff and Esman •. This
strength, it is suggested, lies in the fragile but
salient linkages established within the system and in
the relevance of the various cooperative organizations
to economic and political change. ·
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Most of the structural characteristics which seem
to characterize the more viable development associations in Asia are also present in the Yemeni case.
A
multilevel organization evolved through simultaneous
activity at several discrete levels:
within villages,
lineages, or other local communities; within towns,
especially among petty merchants and civil servants; at
the district and regional levels; at the provincial
level; and in Sana'a. These activities, which occurred
spontaneously only in a few regions of the country,
were generalized on a national scale. The result was a
two-tier organization, with each tier also consisting
of two levels. The top tier, the cooperative confederation, is divided into the central offices of CYDA and
the provincial CCs.
The local development organizations likewise have two tiers:
the development board
and the general assembly.
There has been greater
routinization of official process in the upper tiers,
but project activity relies mainly on the less institutionalized lower tier.
The development associations are multifunctional
and have engaged in a range of interrelated developmental activities.
Whereas roads, water facilities,
schools, clinics, and electrification were each handled
by separate ministries at the national level, development associations engaged in various combinations of
these activities. Roads were the main activity in mountainous districts, but more water projects were undertaken in the hot coastal plain.
Again, this feature
was not a product of design but a reflection of initial, unregulated project activity.
In addition to
actual project activities, the arena of the development
associations provided certain state-like functions,
including the occasional adjudication of disputer and a
certain amount of verbal interest articulation. 9 The
development associations also tax and have been responsible for a national population census. Both the flexibility and the mul tifunctionali ty of the development
associations are related to the absence of other modern
-civic institutions.
The multiple channels are also more de facto than
de Jure, or at least include both sanctioned and informal or interpersonal linkages.
Some of the channels
specified within the system are hypothetical or latent
rather than operative, especially at the lower echelons.
Nonetheless linkages within the system approximate the criteria for multiple channels identified by
Uphoff and Esman. These suggest that "(e)very function
Qf rural development -- planning and goal setting, resource mobilization, provision of services, integration
of services, control of administration, and claimmaking" should be shared between local and central
organizations .20
Linkages among levels and elements
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should promote formation of a system or network of information and resources exchange.
These include both
channels within the local organizations' framework and
linkages to national, local, and private sector institutions.
Comparison of the Asian cases indicates that
the linkage function is performed more effectively when
a number of channels operate concurrently, since any
single channel may be blocked, monopolized, dysfunctional, or otherwise unsatisfactory.
Linkages represented by the emerging cooperative
framework have been very important.
Historically,
development of the local organizations has been an attempt to construct an alternative local or regional-tonational linkage, alternative to the only preexisting
channel, an appointed, rigid, and generally unresponsive bureaucracy of local administration.
In terms of
local social behavior, every development organization
is demonstrably tied into tribal or other traditional
(but changing) power relationships. The ·self-help association represents a third alternative, neither of
the state nor of primordial society, but a means of
bridging the gap between the two. The prescribed system of project planning and implementation within the
system outlined above represents a possible, but not
the only available, channel for mobilizing resources,
making claims, and providing services.
The multiplicity of funding sources for most projects is an
indicator of multiple channels.
So is the fact that
deviation from the prescribed procedure is more common
than adherence to formal channels.
Uphoff and Esman also offer evidence that decentralization of control aids effective local organization.
The optimal balance of local autonomy with
central planning usually entails devolution of authority from the center to the periphery. As already noted,
the Yemeni example is atypical in that resources are
widely dispersed with the system, not monopolized by
the center.
The zakat (and related surcharges) was
once the principle means of support for the state administration, but its contributioI2 1 to government revenues has declined considerably.
Payment of the
Islamic tithe was made voluntary in 1974, after which
farmers could in good conscience pay to charity or
local projects rather than the tax man.
There were
virtually no other regular taxes collected in the
countryside, save those associated with local development projects.
The government had very limited capacity to tax the millions of dollars which entered the
country every year during the late 1970s.
The government maintained only limited control beyond the administrative centers. The issue of localism vs. centralism
has been salient in cooperative affairs, but it has
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played out differently than in most bureaucratized,
heavily centralized Asian cases.
As Uphoff and Esman point out, decentralized decision-making ls best suited to technologically simple,
small, and relatively inexpensive projects or improvements; more complex and capital intensive operations
are more likely to require scarce technical and managerial skills available only at the central level. The
Yemeni experience demonstrates the same point. Ad hoc
self-help groups served limited development functions
where traditional solutions failed to satisfy new
social needs, but more sophisticated services required
more elaborate organization and linkages to the central
ministries.
The three stages of development of the Yemeni development associations show an interesting pattern.
The first stage was characterized by very localized,
technically illegal and hence highly autonomous, activity on a small scale. In the second state there was a
trend towards much larger organizations, at the suprareglonal and national levels. The third phase has been
characterized by two countervailing tendencies, one
centralizing and the other centripetal.
In 1975 the
government had attempted to enhance central hegemony by
decentralizing local administration from the subprovlnce to the district level.
This move made it possible, though not mandatory, for development associations covering a wide geographical area to subdivide
into district associations. Fission occurred because a
wealthy district wished to keep its resources to itself, or because one or more districts felt their interests were not served by the regional development
association.
Wl thin districts including towns, there
often developed an urban-rural split whicn was resolved
by the formation of separate urban and district development boards. Where village associations were active,
they too often sought recognized autonomy wl thin the
district association, and represented a centripetal
force.
There have been numerous pressures for preservation of local or regional habits against outside incursions. The diversity of ecological and sociological
niches in the country makes it possible for each area
to claim unique problems, which outsiders cannot fully
understand.
Where self-help efforts had not emerged
spontaneously, antipathy towards outside structures
extended to the development associations. Where there
was a history of local development activity, some participants regarded the formation of central institutions and rules as an effort to co-opt local efforts.
Even where there was some local propensity to participate and trust in government to support local activities, neither working people nor elites were neces-
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sarily predisposed to operate according to rules formulated at the center.
In various places and at different times during the first five-year plan period, there
were incidents of armed resistance to the central
state.
It is interesting to note that in several such
instances, associations calling themselves the local
cooperative have continued to function. The particular
circumstances of the 1960s and 1970s made it possible
for local or regional associations to fulfill a somewhat independent statelike role.
At the same time, there are powerful incentives to
rationalize procedures by operating within centralized
structures and guidelines.
The strongest instruction
in the imperatives of rational planning and budgeting
is experience.
While the initial costs of a project
may be raised in one-time-only donations, grants, and
collections, maintenance requires ongoing funds and
supervision.
A few examples of water towers which
collapsed and generators which burnt out illustrated
the necessity of technical planning. Contributions and
donations were voluntary only during stages of initial
enthusiasm or in modest quantities.
Larger and more
ambitious undertakings necessitated either the force of
law to ensure beneficiary financing or outside channels
of funding, or both.
One or two projects could be accomplished piecemeal, with work progressing as funds
become available, but to construct several services
requires some forethought and setting of priori ties.
The ambitions of cooperative leaders may also motivate
them to operate within the sanctioned rules.
The tension between localism and centralism is not
necessarily a zero sum game in which the increased
strengz~ of the one implied a loss of authority by the
other.
The development associations have been
strengthened by their confederation into a rule-making
body, in terms of vertical and horizontal linkages, and
as measured by the services they provide.
At the same
time, the growth of the development and cooperative
associations has helped extend state authority by establishing linkages between the state and residential
communities. These include both institutional channels
and physical linkages in the form of roads and some
central-place services such as secondary schools and
health clinics.
The salience of the network of development cooperative organizations in the national civic arena is
virtually unparalleled. The 1975 cooperative elections
were the first nationwide polling experience in the
national memory, and the 1979 and 1982 cooperative
elections were each better publicized and better attended than the one before.
Elections for municipal
councils and for the constituent· assembly have been
patterned on the cooperative model but have not matched
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it in scope. When there was discussion of a national
referendum on the issue of unity between north and
south Yemen, the LDAs were recognized as the most
viable ins ti tut ion for organizing such a poll.
The
second national population census, in 1981, was organized through CYDA and its member associations, and
later used as the basis for dividing the cooperative
customs tax among districts on the basis of population
density.
THE PROVISION OF SERVICES
The real relevance of the development associations
has been their provision of services to the urbanizing
small towns and the rural areas. They have mobilized
capital for investment in regional and country roads
and other infrastructure essential to capitalist development and contributed to increased rates of literacy among modern youth.
Many local development projects are stop-gap or semicompleted measures. Locally
initiated vehicular trails are truly extensive but
never paved without special central or outside technical assistance.
Many schools were built with three
rooms, with additional construction after three or more
years of instruction warranted fourth through sixth
grade rooms.
The nature of water projects varied
tremendously according to environmental conditions
(anything from a cistern to deepwell with piped houseto-house delivery) but were typically regarded as
incomplete.
The same was true of electrification
schemes, which initially offered a few hour's service
in the evening. Hence they do not compare in quality
or durability to the government's development projects.
But the numbers of small projects accomplished by selfhelp organizations and the extent of access to cooperatively built services makes them important.
Projects
initiated by communities or development boards offer
rudimentary services to far more people than government
services. Whereas both government and private sector
investments have gravitated heavily towards the three
cities and a few medium-sized towns along the paved
roads, cooperative sector investments are more evenly
distributed among a predominantly rural population.
Part of the managerial weakness of both the development organizations and the government lies in the
absence of reliable data and records on critical development variables.
All figures referring to land
tenure, farm output, expenditures by government or the
private or cooperative sectors, or international trade
and foreign assistance are estimates. CYDA's published
records reveal as much about the evolution of the
budgetary system as they do about trends in expenditures.
Nonetheless, records of the first three-year
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plan period, 1973-76, and of the 1976-81 plan, do indicate the magnitude of development investments by the
cooperative sector compared with the contributions of
government and private investors.
The first national three-year plan, formulated in
1973, was a very preliminary exercise in defining the
parameters of development expenditures and capital
23
formation.
The plan indicated general targets for
growth in various sectors of the economy.
Only two
investment sectors were identified, the public sector
and the private sector. The public sector was expected
to provide somewhat more than half of all development
expenditures under the plan, with the assistance of
foreign donors. No mention was made of the cooperative
sector.
Thanks to the infusion of remittances, actual
growth (seven percent) was higher than anticipated (six
percent).
Growth was registered primarily by the private sector, which spent sixty percent more than planned.
Although its spending increased dramatically in
the last year of the plan period, the government fell
short of its targets and relied increasingly on foreign
assistance.
Even the broadly indicated material targets of the
plan were not achieved.
Investment in agriculture and
industry, especially, fell short of planned objectives.
The increase in private sector spending occurred mainly
in commodity trade and real estate.
Total public
sector development spending under the plan was YR 1.37
billion (U.S. $305 million).
The CYDA records, released independently, show
total development expenditures during the same period
of YR 180. 8 million ( $40. 2 million).
Approximately
two-thirds of this amount was raised in citizen's
contributions of one form or another.
The government
had contributed about one percent (this was before the
promise of more), and the difference came from over
seven dozen reporting LDAs. By 1976, eighty boards reported having cut some 5100 kilometers of rural roads,
relying on beneficiary work crews and cash donations.
Seventy-four development associations reported having
built 581 schools.
Sixty-three associations reported
having worked on nearly 700 small and medium-sized
water projects.
Only eleven health projects were reported by ten development associations, but twenty-two
LDAs reported having contributed to eighty-five miscellaneous projects.
Field observations suggest that
these are reasonable counts of the numbers of projects
undertaken, although the relationship between national
and cooperative development spending should not be
taken at face value.
In drawing up the five-year d~velopment program,
the Central Planning Organization (CPO) drew on some of
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the lessons of the first experience. The second plan
was more detailed and textured. Unlike the three-year
program, which identified only two investment sectors,
the five-year plan anticipated investment from the
public, the private, the cooperative, and real and projected 'mixed' sectors. A significant share of financing wa~ expected to come from abroad, most of it in
support of public and mixed sector investments.
The
public, the private, and the mixed sectors were each
expected to contribute about a third of development
financing. Projects by local development associations
were expected to represent scarcely seven percent of
total development investment. However, the local development associations were indicated to receive only a
tiny fraction of international assistance, so the cooperative sector was e~cted to provide twelve percent
of domestic financing.
A World Bank study, entitled
"Yemen Arab Republic Local Developm~§t Associations: a
New Approach to Rural Development,"
concluded that in
the mid-to-late 1970s the development associations were
more effective than the central government in providing
primary services to the rural areas. In the two fiscal
years 1976-77 and 1977-78, government development expenditures totaled YR 1751 million, of which YR 873
came from the state's budget. During the same period,
the development associations reported expenditures of
YR 508 million, less than the central state, to be
sure, but a respectable contribution.
Clearly local
development association spending was far higher relative to state investments than supposed by the CPO.
The Bank report also points out that only a fraction of
LOA funds went towards administrative costs.
During the 1978-1981 three-year cooperative plan
period, local projects' spending still did not conform
to submitted plans. CYDA records show the relationship
between planned and reported spending by development
associaz&ons during the period, in millions of Yemeni
riyals:
PLANNED
REPORTED
PROPORTION
YR 615
YR 811.6
123%
268
245.1
91%
103
151.3
146%
58
21.1
36%
94
70.2
74%
325
360.2
111%
YR 1463
YR 1959.5
113%
"Other" in these figures includes electricity, youth
clubs, traffic triangles, mosques, and so forth.
The
miscellaneous category groups the activities of agricultural cooperatives with foreign aid and CYDA direct
investments. Expenditures on roads and especially
water were higher than anticipated, as was foreign aid
Roads
Education
Water
Health
Other
Miscellaneous
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to CYDA (negligible in the plan).
Overall investment
by the cooperative sector was higher than planned by
the development associations, and considerably higher
than planned in the national program.
The records of the cooperative confederation also
show that the bulk of local development project expenses continued to be borne by citizens, both directly
in the form of project financing and indirectly in the
form of contributions to the LDA budget. The following
table compares the contribution of local, development
board, and governmental financing to ~7ojects reported
to CYDA during two three-year periods.
1973 to 1976
1978/79 - 1980/81
% from % from
Citizens Board
Roads
Schools
Water
Health
Other
Total

72
54
32
31
17

Oir

28
45
68
69
78

35

% from
Gov't
1
5
-1-

% from
Citizens
62
39
52
32
23

52

%from
Board

% from
Gov't

37
41
29
63
79

1
18
10
5
14

38

--g-

The government contributed more to locally initiated
projects in the late 1970s than it had prior to 1976,
but still failed to meet its obligations according to
the CYDA formula.
The total central contribution in
the latter three-year span was eight percent, mostly
assistance for schools, electricity and miscellaneous
projects.
The development associations covered a
slightly higher proportion of total costs in the second
period than in the first.
Their proportional contribution to roads increased; they picked up the slack in
government allocations to local education; and they
were the primary source of financing for heal th and
other, elective projects.
Citizen's contributions declined from two-thirds
in the first period to slightly more than half in the
second.
Local funding for roads accounted for over
half of all local development expenditures between 1973
and 1976, and remained the major items in the latter
report period as well.
Local resources also covered
one-third to one-half of the costs of most school,
water, and health projects. The category of citizens'
contributions should not be understood to imply only
voluntary or charitable donations but 21fvers a wide
range of local fund-raising mechanisms.
Variations
in these are literally too numerous to examine.
They
have included charity drives and also taxes, levies,
user fees, and various collective ownership schemes.
They have varied not only regionally but from one project to the next, according to the nature and cost of
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the service provided. In some cases social control and
voluntarism have served, but in others local administration author! ties have enforced the obligation to
contribute.
What is significant about the extent of
citizens contributions is that they represent multiple
channels for resource mobilization, not specified by
law but more or less tailored to a particular project
effort.
In addition to direct contributions to projects,
local revenues provided a major source of income to the
regular LOA budgets.
The following table shows the
composition of recorded LOA 2~comes for two periods of
the national five-year plan:
1976-78, the first two
years; and 1978-81, a three year span.
1976-78
Central incomes
Local revenues from zakat
Local revenues from citizens

9%

18%
73%

1978-81

9%

34%

57%

TOTAL

gr
28%
63%

Non-zakat local revenues contributed three-quarters of
incomes in the first two years and over half in the
last three years.
Proportional income from the zakat
doubled, reflecting perhaps some improvement in collections as well as the rise in the official share due
the development cooperatives from half to threequarters.
Central revenues contributed an even nine
percent to development association revenues.
These figures demonstrate that the activities
reported by the development associations have been
financed primarily from noncentral sources.
As noted
earlier, the extent of reliance on informal financial
channels is made possible by the unusual confluence of
circumstances, large amounts of cash outside the formal
banking system and practically untaxed by the central
state.
The relevance of the local development associations to capital formation and services provision
during the period of the five-year plan was substantial.
Private sector spending was again higher than
targeted, but tended to concentrate in the transport
and trade of imported commodities and urban construction. The government made visible progress in the construction of national infrastructure for transport,
communications, education, and health, but its development spending was lower than planned. Most of the unanticipated growth occurred in the construction sector,
electricity and water, and public services.
Agriculture was scheduled for fourteen percent of investment
under the plan, mostly from the private sector, but
reportedly attracted only eight percent.
Although a detailed account of spending during the
plan period or other reliable data comparing investment
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by the development cooperatives with private, public
and mixed sector investments and foreign assistance are
not available, all indications are that the self-help
contribution has been considerably greater than the
seven percent projected in the five-year plan.
While
the government, with international technical assistance, has paved and culverted a basic grid of two
north-sou th and two west-east two-lane highways, the
development associations reliably report work on at
least 15,000 kilometers of rural roads which now reach
most inhabited sections of the country.
CYDA records
of expenditures in water during the final three years
of the plan period represent ten percent of total
national expenditures on water and electricity together
over the five years.
National expenditures in education and health amounted to YR 1294 million, compar38
with YR 266. 2 million for the cooperative sector.
Whether or not these figures and proportions can be
taken at face value, the overall relevanoe of spending
in the cooperative sector to the development of public
services has been considerable.
The development associations have consistently raised and invested more
resources than expected, often in the area where
government has failed to meet plan targets.
It is
clear that the development cooperatives have been
partly responsible for rapid growth in transport, water
and electricity, and educational services.
The relevance of development cooperation has been
in the formation of capital for investment in very
basic services to smaller towns and the more densely
populated rural areas. The distribution of effects and
benefits from cooperative projects has been more even
and equitable both geographically and socially than the
effects of foreign, central, or private sector expenditures. While there is some tendency for local development spending to concentrate in administrative and commercial centers, this tendency is far more pronounced
in both state and entrepreneurial investment patterns.
Direct international assistance has also clustered in
the urban areas and the most productive agricultural
regions.
Self-help activity defers to the other
sectors in that LDAs and local communities tend not to
pursue projects which private or state agencies seem
likely to undertake.
The importance of development
cooperation has been in providing just those interim
services which alternative channels have been unwilling
or unable to foster.
If there had been no local development activity the alternative channels may_ have
behaved a bit differently, but there would probably be
greater inequities in access to services than existed
at the beginning of the second national five-year plan
in 1982.
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In contemplating a new development program for the
1980s, both the nation and the CYDA organizations faced
new circumstances and challenges.
On the one hand,
there was a clear national imperative for rational
planning and management of resources. With the end of
the oil boom, remittances from the Arab Gulf into the
Y.A.R. leveled off.
But imports continued to rise.
Faced with growing budget deficits and its first
balance of payments deficit, the government called for
"less consumerism and more inve~fment," particularly in
agriculture and agro-industry.
A certain level of
services had been attained, but it would be necessary
to further extend, integrate, and maintain utilities,
roads and schools. The government sought to bring all
primary schools under a unified public curriculum and
to produce a new generation of literate men and women.
Roads require repair after rain or heavy use, at least
until drainage and embankments are provided. Work was
in progress to bring the whole country into an integrated twenty-four-hour-a-day electricity system. Urban
heal th services had improved, but access to medical
facilities in the countryside remained poor.
While
many communities still lacked adequate water resources,
high rates of drilling and pumping in certain regions
raised fears of depleted aquafers.
Overall, the improvement in services, especially in the truly rural
areas, was relative only to the very low starting
point.
The cooperative associations had provided very
basic services and made a leading contribution to
expansion of the national road network. They provided
for some integration of services at the regional and
local level. Agricultural cooperatives, still in their
infancy during the first five-year plan, nonetheless
represented a possible solution to the dilemma of
private sector underinvestment in agriculture. In view
of the government's incapacity to tax rural incomes,
the mobilization of resources through informal and
semiformal channels was impressive.
The development
associations provided necessary and sufficient organization for investment in basic services.
Cooperative
investments in roads and utilities facilitated the
penetration of capitalism into the periphery and the
emergence of a rural and semiurban bourgeoisie. Roads,
schools, and other projects and the cooperative associations themselves constituted important material and
institutional linkages within the Y.A.R., thus contributing also to the augmentation of state power.
The end of the first five-year plan period seemed
to signify the beginning of a new stage for the development cooperatives associations.
First, in many
regions what could be accomplished relying primarily on
local resources had been accomplished. Rural roads had
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been the most important development activity in the
mountainous interior of the country, but new road construction leveled off in most regions between 1978 and
1981.
With international assistance, the Ministry of
Education was building more rural schools and assuming
responsibility for administration and curriculum in
locally constructed schools.
Local development of
water resources was seriously constrained by geophysical factors in some areas.
One very rudimentary level
of services had been achieved, but to improve this
basic infrastructure required higher financial, technical, and managerial inputs. Heretofore the strength
of local development associations had been in activating informal channels for technically simple projects.
To raise the level of services now required greater
degrees of coordination and planning.
There was an effort to both rationalize and
centralize local development channels.
For the 1982
cooperative elections guidelines were pursued for voter
and candidate registration.
The CYDA law of 1981
formalized the identity and role of the cooperative
confederation and the coordinating councils, and the
participation of deputy ministers of public works,
health,
education, planning,
and other government
agencies on the administrative board of CYDA.
The
exact channeling of zakat from taxpayer to development
board account had always been left vague, but was now
to be collected centrally and dispersed to the LDAs
through CYDA upon review of their accounts.
Poor and
sparsely populated districts which had been unable or
unwilling to undertake self-help were granted an additional share of the cooperative customs tax as an
inducement.
Village associations, which had been
active mostly in the southern uplands, were discredited
for their failure to respect plans and formal procedures; having formalized the central cooperative
institutions, the government pointed out that the
village associations lacked any legal basis.
Steps
were taken to encourage the more even and regular participation of the district and town associations in cooperative affairs. All of these represented efforts to
institutionalize the system and to encourage new al~~
cations of resources consistent with national goals.
At the 1983 cooperative conference, emphasis was
on investments in income-generating and productive
activities. Development associations would continue to
help provide public services, especially in the heretofore neglected heal th sector.
However, the new direction in the 1980s would be toward projects which
either generated revenue or stimulated capital investment in the private sector.
It was therefore hoped
that the cooperative associations·would supply institutional support for productive investments.
While
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diversifying away from very primary services, the
development cooperative organizations would continue to
support investments in projects relatively neglected by
the government and the private sector.
Credi ts for
projects which promised a return on the initial investment would be offered by the cooperative credit bank to
qualifying associations.
Both local
development
associations and shareholder cooperatives should participate in investment credits.
In the case of LDAs,
income from equipment or facility rental or other revenue-bearing activities would be used to support truly
public services, from clinic to welfare to cultural
events. Shareholder cooperatives were expected both to
provide services to a specialized group, farmers,
fishermen, craftspeople, and to pursue corporate goals
of capital accumulation for shareholder dividends as
well as reinvestment.
As with previous developments
within the cooperative movement, this new direction
called for widespread adoption of policies already
practiced by some vanguard associations.
Administration of a credit system and management
of more sophisticated services will, of course, require
tighter supervision than in the past.
Centralization
and routinization of process are further warranted by
several considerations. Central initiatives are probably necessary to offset the increased peripheralization
of districts and regions which haven't participated in
self-help.
From a national perspective it is crucial
to raise farm and industrial output if a widening
balance of payments deficit is to be avoided.
More
complex services, projects, and events will necessitate
the maintenance of a system of files and more efficient
auditing.
This is especially true if investment
capital is borrowed.
Operation of any of the known
investment projects, tractors, bulldozers, drilling
rigs, service stations, agricultural experiment and
extension stations, utilities companies, refrigeration
of fresh fish, light manufacturers, and new irrigation
schemes, requires both technical skill and office
back-up.
Although some Yemenis fear overregulation of selfhelp, the Y.A.R. development associations and cooperatives are considerably less controlled than comparable
organizations elsewhere in the Third World.
The
question now seems to be whether more management and
routinization of process will make local development
more efficient and equitable, or merely stifle the
element of spontaneity and success realized in the past
two decades.
If the development cooperative associations are to have the same relevance in the 1980s as
they have shown in the first development decade, major
adaptations of financial and political practice
will
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be necessary.
If self-help cannot evolve to accommodate more complex issues, then it will be necessary to
conclude that the relative success of local development
associations was a unique and fleeting result of extraordinary circumstances at a particular stage of development.
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